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Community Property v. The Elective Share
Terry L. Turnipseed
I. INTRODUCTION
There is certainly no doubt that community property has its
faults. But, as with any flawed thing, one must look at it in
comparison with the alternatives: separate property and its
companion, the elective share. This Article argues that the elective
share is so flawed that it should be jettisoned in favor of
community property.'
The elective share can trace its ancestry to dower and curtesy,
with the concept of dower dating to ancient times.2 In old England,
a widowed woman was given a life estate in one-third of certain of
her husband's real property-property in which the husband held
an inheritable or devisable interest during the marriage.3 Once
dower attached to a parcel of land at the inception of the marriage,
the husband could not unilaterally terminate it by transferring the
land.4 The right would spring to life upon the husband's death
unless the wife had also consented to the transfer by signing the
deed, even if title were held in only the husband's name.5
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1. A separate property jurisdiction does not follow the rules of a
community property state that "recognizes the mutuality of marital
*

relationships." ROGER W. ANDERSEN & IRA MARK BLOOM, FUNDAMENTALS OF
TRUSTS AND ESTATES 246 (2d. ed. 2002). Community property is property held

jointly between husband and wife, including: "property acquired through the
efforts of either spouse during the marriage and while domiciled in a community
property jurisdiction ... and income or proceeds from the sale of community
property." Id. "Separate property in a community property state [is] property
that a spouse owned before marriage or acquired during marriage by inheritance
or by gift from a third party .

. . ."

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1369 (7th ed.

2001). Husband and wife each hold one-half ownership in the community
property and 100% ownership in their separate property. ANDERSEN & BLOOM,
supra, at 246. "At death, both spouses usually have the power to dispose of their
own separate property and half of the community property." Id.
2.

JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 423 (7th ed.

2005).
3. Id. at 422-23.
4. Id. at 423.
5. Id.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

162

[Vol. 72

Curtesy provided a surviving husband with a life estate in all
the wife's qualifying real property, but only if children were born
to the couple. 6 The type of real property that was subject to curtesy
was the same as with dower, as were the rules that related to when
the right attached and when it could be terminated.
Virtually all United States jurisdictions have abolished dower
and curtesy in favor of the elective share.8 Georgia is the only state
which does not have a statutory elective share or community
property concepts.9 In modern America, then, 49 of the 50 states
and the District of Columbia limit freedom of testation vis-A-vis
surviving spouses.] 0
More than in any other area of wills and trusts, state laws differ
over the exact details of their respective elective share doctrines.
For example, state law varies widely in the amount to which the
surviving spouse is entitled, the variables that determine the
amount (length of marriage, family situation, surviving spouse's
net worth, etc.), and the property that is subject to the elective
share." Typically, the surviving spouse is allowed to elect onethird of the decedent-spouse's property if the decedent had
surviving issue or one-half if there are no surviving issue.
In some states, a testator can easily avoid subjecting her assets
to the elective share upon death simply by placing assets into one
or more types of trusts.13 Other more sophisticated elective share
statutes bring back most inter vivos transfers into the pool of assets
from which the elective share is taken, including those inter vivos
transfers made to trusts.
All elective share statutes, however, can be defeated by
transferring assets to an offshore asset protection trust. 14 Once the
transferor-decedent has died, it is, in reality, impossible for a

6. Id.
7.

Id.

8. Though the "forms of action we have buried .. . still rule us from their
graves." Emerson G. Spies, Property Rights of the Surviving Spouse, 46 VA. L.
REV. 157, 158 n.8 (1960) (quoting F.W. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT
COMMON LAW 2 (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., 1936) (1909)).
9. Jeffrey N. Pennell, Minimizing the Surviving Spouse's Elective Share,
32 U. MIAMI L. CENTER EST. PLAN. § 904 (1998).
10. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY
LAW 245 (1989).
11. See generally discussion infra Part III.
12. See generally discussion infra Part III.
13. See discussion infra Part IV.B.1.a.
14. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
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United States court to force the transfer of such assets back into the
hands of the surviving spouse.' 5
While there may or may not have been valid grounds for
separate property systems with elective share concepts when they
were originally adopted by most U.S. states, we are long overdue
for a total review of separate property and whether a systematic
switch to community property should be undertaken. The primary
purpose of this Article is to stimulate such discussions, with the
hopeful result that state legislatures will at least address the issue
of switching to community property. Separate share systems can
easily be defeated by the wealthy who can afford expensive
counsel fees to configure assets in needless, wasteful and complex
arrangements specifically designed to defeat the elective share. As
discussed in more detail below, there is increasingly a distinction
between those who can afford testamentary freedom in separate
property jurisdictions (through the high fees of competent
advisors) and those who cannot. This distinction is shameful and
should be eliminated.
Absent converting to community property concepts, there is no
way to produce an effective elective share law.' 6
II. HISTORY OF DOWER, CURTESY, AND THE ELECTIVE SHARE

A. Dower and Curtesy Generally
In approachingthe history of compulsory shares accorded by
the common law to a decedent's widow . .. one finds that the tale

is discontinuous, the moral correspondinglyrecondite.17
For a long time in this country, and still in some separate
property states today, a widow had a dower interest in the lands of
her deceased husband which were inheritable by the husband and
wife's issue.' Widows received a life estate-not outright
ownership-in one-third of her deceased husband's qualifying
land.' 9
Unlike modem elective share rights, common law dower
attached at the later of the moment of marriage or acquisition of

15. Thomas M. Brinker, Jr. & Thomas P. Langdon, The Offshore Trust: An
Asset Protection Tool, 59 OHIO CPA J. 31, 32 (2000).
16. See discussion infra Part IV.
17. Edmond N. Cahn, Restraints on Disinheritance,85 U. PA. L. REV. 139,
139 (1936).
18. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 422-23.
19. Id.

164

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

the qualifying land. 2 0 This aspect of dower is much more similar to
the modem system of community property, where rights attach
before death. Because of this inter vivos attachment of rights
(albeit a right to a future interest), land subject to dower was not
alienable at the sole discretion of the husband-owner.21 Indeed, in
jurisdictions where common law dower and a statutory elective
share exist together, one of dower's only practical applications is
to force the owner-spouse of real property to obtain the signature
of the nonowner-spouse to sell or encumber the land in certain
situations.22 In addition, widows of insolvent decedents received
paid (unlike bequests, which could be
dower before debts were
23
claimed by creditors). Dower made women "necessary players in
men's economic transactions." 24
Curtesy was the widower equivalent of dower, with a couple
key differences: (1) the widower was given a life estate in the
entire land holdings of the decedent wife (instead of one-third as in
the case of dower); and (2 nothing flowed to the widower unless
the marriage bore children. s In all states that retain the concepts of
dower and curtesy, the rights embraced by both are identical; and
in some jurisdictions, curtesy has been abolished and dower rights
are afforded to widows and widowers equally. 26
B. Ancient History ofDower and Curtesy
Limitations upon free testation are at least as old as the Code
ofHammurabi27 [circa2084 B.C]. 28
20. Id. at 423.
2 1. See id.
22. See id.
23. MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY
AMERICA 143 (1986).
24. Ariela R. Dubler, In the Shadow of Marriage: Single Women and the
Legal Construction of the Family and the State, 112 YALE L.J. 1641, 1666
(2003).
25. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 423.
26. Id In Michigan, dower-type rights are given to the wife but not the
husband. Id. Commentators note that this difference is likely unconstitutional. Id.
27. See Cahn, supra note 17, at 139 (citing R. HARPER, THE CODE OF
HAMMURABI §§ 168-172 (1904)); see also Rick Geddes & Paul J. Zak, The
Rule of One-Third, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 119, 123 Table 1 (2002) (describing
women's property rights at marital dissolution from the Code of Hammurabi to
1977). Geddes and Zak detail the very first known dower-type code language
from the original Code of Hammurabi:
In the case of either a private soldier or a commissary, who was carried
off while in the armed service of the king, if his son is able to look after
the feudal obligations, the field and orchard shall be given to him and he
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During the early times in England, when land holdings
virtually equaled wealth, the land passed to blood relatives and not
to surviving spouses-" [n]either husband nor wife was an heir of
the other . . . ."29 Widows and widowers of decedent landholders
were not left penniless, however as dower and curtesy provided
some support for their lifetime.o These income rights in land
"developed in medieval times to compensate women for loss of
control over their real property during marriage and, especially, to
make provision for widows after their husbands' property had
passed to the legal heirs." 3 1
Dower was originally a private contractual matter between the
families of the groom and bride. 32 Thirteenth-centurY common law
recognized and enforced an early version of dower. The dower of

shall look after the feudal obligations of his father. If his son is so young
that he is not able to look after the feudal obligations of his father, onethird of the field and orchard shall be given to his mother in order that his
mother may rear him. If a man should decide to divorce a sugitu who
bore him children, or a naditu who provided him with children, they shall
return to that woman her dowry and they shall give her one half of (her
husband's) field, orchard, and property, and she shall raise her children;
after she has raised her children, they shall give her a share comparable in
value to that of one heir from whatever properties are given to her sons,
and a husband of her choice may marry her.
Id. at 134-35 (quoting JAMES B. PRITCHARD, ANCIENT NEAR EASTERN TEXTS
RELATING TO THE OLD TESTAMENT 16 (1969); MARTHA T. ROTH, LAW
COLLECTIONS FROM MESOPOTAMIA AND ASIA MINOR 107, par. 137 (1995)).
Sugitu is defined as a "member of a group or class of temple dedicatees, with
special privileges, but always inferior to a naditu." Id. at 134 n.48 (quoting ROTH,
supra, at 273 (1995)). Naditu is defined as a "member of a group or class of Old
Babylonian temple dedicatees, with special inheritance privileges and economic
freedoms; some groups lived in cloisters or compounds, others married but were
not permitted to bear children; Sumerian lukur." Id. at 134 n.49 (quoting ROTH,
supra, at 271). Lukur is a Sumerian term meaning priestess or nun. Ancestral and
Extinct Language Translations: Nun, WEBSTER'S ONLINE DICTIONARY, http:/
www.websters-online-dictionary.org/Nu/Nun.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2011).
28. PERCY ELLWOOD CORBETT, THE ROMAN LAW OF MARRIAGE 147 n.1.
(1930).
29. Sheldon J. Plager, The Spouse's Nonbarrable Share: A Solution in
Search of a Problem, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 698 (1966) (citing 2 RICHARD R.
POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 176 (1950)).
30. See id.
31. LEE HOLCOMBE, WIVES & PROPERTY: REFORM OF THE MARRIED
WOMEN'S PROPERTY LAW IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 21 (1983).
32. Id.
33. Id.
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a one-third fixed interest in the decedent husband's lands3 4 likely
came about during the early 15th century. 35 (This rather arbitrary
one-third interest was, oddly, carried all the way to the dower and
curtesy laws of early America and is inherent in many elective
share laws today.3 6 ) The widow lost her dower interest, however, if
the husband-decedent had been guilty of treason or if the widow
herself had been guilty of a felony, adultery, or treason.3 7
Much like community property laws today, the wife was
granted a property interest in any real property received by the
husband during marriage, even though her husband had legal title
to the land.3 8 The husband could not defeat her dower right without
her consent; 39 though, if his wife agreed, he could bar dower by
levying a fine when he conveyed his land to a third party without
restrictions. 40 The Statute of Uses of 1535 gave a married couple
the right to enter into an antenuptial agreement whereby the wife
would give up her right to dower in exchange for a jointure-a
"settlement of land upon her at least for her own lifetime."4 1
Because of the two distinct types of court systems which
existed during this era-law courts and ecclesiastical courts 4 2-the
manner used to determine the recipient of the tangible personal
34. Speculation exists that early dower may have been the origin of the
husband's promise during a traditional marriage service: "With all my worldly
goods I thee endow." Id.
35. Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritanceand the Modern Family, 45 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 83, 89 n.18 (1994) (citing 3 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 193 (5th ed. 1942)).
36. Id
37. HOLCOMBE, supra note 31, at 22.
38. Brashier, supra note 35, at 90 n.20 (1994). Brashier states:
The wife's expectant or contingent interest in the lands of which her
husband was seised in fee simple and fee tail at any time during the
marriage was known as dower inchoate. If the dower right had not been
barred and the contingency of survival had been fulfilled, her inchoate
right became dower consummate upon her husband's death. Until her
dower was actually assigned, however, she had no right to enter upon
the lands except under her right of quarantine.
Id. (citing George L. Haskins, Estates Arisingfrom the Marriage Relationship
and Their Characteristics,in 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 5.1, 5.31-5.49
(A. James Casner ed., 1952)) (emphasis omitted); see also Statute of Uses of
1535, 27 Hen. 8, ch. 10 (Eng.) (repealed).
39. Brashier, supra note 35, at 91. "Neither the testator's will nor his inter
vivos transactions could unilaterally defeat the dower right once the required
elements were met." Id.
40. HOLCOMBE, supra note 31, at 22.
41. Id.
42. Plager, supra note 29, at 698 (citing I HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 625 (1922); Thomas E. Atkinson, Brief History of English
TestamentaryJurisdiction,8 Mo. L. REv. 107 (1943)).
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property varied widely. The Statute of Distribution of 167043 set
the widow's intestate share of tangible personal property: one-third
if the decedent husband left descendants and one-half if there were
no descendants."
Chattels, however, were never subject to dower. 45 Once
married, a wife's tangible personal property became the property
of her husband.4 6 If the husband predeceased his wife, the tangible
personal property that belonged to the widow before her marriage
was "kindly" returned to her, but on' if the decedent husband had
not alienated the items before death.
Dower was necessary during this time because "[t]he extreme
subordination of the wife at common law required that some form
of protection from disinheritance be given to her upon the death of
her husband, for often she was deemed unable or unqualified to
venture from the home into a world run almost exclusively by
men." 48 As Blackstone summarized: "The husband and wife are
one, and the husband is that one.'A9
Early English lawyers referred to the husband's life estate as "a
tenant 'by the curtesy of England,' to emphasize the liberality of
the law as opposed to its Norman counterpart."50 Curtesy operated
a little differently than dower under English common law:
Upon entering into a legally cognizable marriage, the
husband acquired a marital tenancy in his wife's inheritable
freehold estates known as [f]ure uxoris ["by right of the
wife"] for the joint lives of the couple. He acquired his
curtesy interest only upon the birth of issue capable of
inheriting, at which time his interest was converted into an
estate for his life known as curtesy initiate. Upon the wife's
death, the husband's life estate was known as curtesy
consummate. Because curtesy was limited to a life estate in
the wife's interests of which she was seised in possession at
the time of her death, the husband could not enjoy curtesy
43. Id. (citing Statute of Distribution of 1670, 22 & 23 Car. 2, ch. 10 (Eng.)).
44. Id. at 699
45. Geddes & Zak, supra note 27, at 124 (quoting MARGARET M.
MCCAUGHAN, THE LEGAL STATUS OF MARRIED WOMEN INCANADA 9 (1977)).
46. Brashier, supra note 35, at 89 n.19 (citing George L. Haskins, The
Estateby the MaritalRight, 97 U. PA. L. REv. 345, 345 n.1 (1949)).
47. Id. (citing Haskins, supra note 46, at 345 n. 1).
48. Id. at 90-91.
49. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 256 (William C. Sprague ed.,
9th ed. 1915).
50. Brashier, supra note 35, at 91 n.27 (quoting George L. Haskins, Curtesy
at Common Law: Historical Development, 29 B.U. L. REv. 228, 230 (1949))
(emphasis omitted).
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as to reversionary or remainder interests she owned at the
time of her death.
While men received a 100% interest in the wife's lands, as
opposed to the wife's one-third interest in the husband's lands, the
husband was required to have issue who could inherit to obtain the
curtesy interest. No such requirement existed for a surviving wife
to receive dower. 53 As noted by commentators, this prerequisite of
a male heir may help explain "the eagerness with which the first
heir was awaited, even by men with few of the normal fatherly
characteristics."S4
The wide grant of the right of curtesy dates at least to the end
of the 12th century. 5 This earl right "was enlarged over the
course of the thirteenth century." After 1833, dower and curtesy
were abolished in England. For 105 years thereafter, there was
complete testamentary freedom in England. 8 Between 1938 and
1975, an English statute provided that a court could in its
discretion award maintenance to a surviving spouse and other
specified descendants where the testator deprived them of a
"reasonable share" of the property. 59 From 1975 forward, the
surviving spouse's claim was not limited to maintenance. Instead,
a court had the same discretion afforded in a divorce situation to
award "reasonable financial provision" taking into account all
circumstances including conduct of the parties.6

51. Id. at 90 n.20 (citing 2 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL
PROPERTY$ 210, at 15-93 (Patrick J. Rohan rev. ed., 1993)) (emphasis omitted).
52. Id. at 91-92 & n.28. There were several elements of the issue
requirement of old common law curtesy. Id. at 92 n.28. First, the mother and
child must have survived childbirth. Id. Second, the husband might not receive
curtesy if the marriage only bore daughters. Id. Finally, if the real property had
been conveyed to the wife "in special tail" during a former marriage, the current
husband would have no curtesy interest. Id.
53. Brashier, supra note 35, at 92.
54. Id. at 92 n.29 (citing JOHN E. CRIBBET & CORWIN W. JOHNSON,
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 90 (3d ed. 1989)).
55. Id. at 91 n.27 (citing Haskins, supra note 50, at 228).
56. Id. (citing Haskins, supra note 50, at 228-29).
57. GLENDON, supra note 10, at 241.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 241-42.

2011]

COMMUNITY PROPERTY V ELECTIVE SHARE

169

C. History ofDower and Curtesy in America
Borrowedfrom England, these estates represent the earliest
form of protectionfrom spousal disinheritanceestablished in the
United States.61
Like much of early American property law, dower and curtesy
were imported from England.6 2 Today, the difference between the
laws in England and America are dramatic. 6 3 At first, dower and
curtesy rights varied quite a bit between the colonies and later
between the states. 64 Early dower and curtesy statutes also varied
from their English roots.
In jolly old England, when land was the major source of wealth
for most well-off families, the dower system actually worked well
in terms of adequacy of support.66 Nevertheless, in the modem era
of intangible wealth, dower makes very little sense and often
results in little or no support at all. Because of this, dower (and
curtesy) has been abolished in a large majority of separate property
jurisdictions.68 Dower survives alongside elective share statutes in
four states: Arkansas, Kentucky, Michigan, and Ohio; 69 though
there are substantial differences between modem-day dower and
traditional English dower. 70 In Michigan and Ohio, a surviving
spouse must choose either dower or an elective share. 7 As

61. Brashier, supra note 35, at 90.
62. See Geddes & Zak, supra note 27, at 122 ("This right was considered so
important that it was included in the Magna Carta by King Henry III.. ...
63. GLENDON, supra note 10, at 244.
64. Brashier, supra note 35, at 90 n.21 (citing SALMON, supra note 23, at
141-84; Richard H. Chused, Married Women's Property Law: 1800-1850, 71
GEO. L.J. 1359, 1393-95 (1983)).
65. Id. at 92 n.30 (citing George L. Haskins, Curtesy in the United States,
100 U. PA. L. REv. 196, 197). For example, the old English curtesy requirements
of actual seisin and birth of issue were not present in most American versions.
See generally id
66.

DUKEMINIER ET AL., supranote 2, at 423. Of course, the widows did not

own any of the land in fee simple.
67. Id.
68. Id. Dower inchoate, i.e., the vested expectation of a dower interest
during the life of both husband and wife, acted as a restraint on alienability of
real property. Brashier, supra note 35, at 93 n.32. This was another reason for its
decline in America. Id.
69.

DUKEMINIER ET AL., supranote 2, at 423.

70. See Brashier,supra note 35, at 93 n.35 (providing a full discussion of
the differences).
71. DUKEMINIERETAL.,supra note 2, at 423.
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discussed, elective share laws usually yield more assets;
consequently, dower in this country is effectively moot. 72

III. DESCRIPTION OF ELECTIVE SHARE STATUTES
Caution. There is no subject in this book on which there is more
statutory variation than the survivingspouse's elective share.73
Unfortunately for the goal of simplicity, the elective share
statutes vary widely, 74 and have been described as:
[A] jungle, with hardly two states to be found that are
exactly alike, and there exists in reality 50 different
schemes most of which, when analyzed, are not built upon
a single, adequate interest given the surviving spouse; but
instead give her a bit of homestead, a bit of widow's
allowance, and in addition a bit of dower or some statutory
substitute therefore.7 5
Every separate property jurisdiction except Georgia gives a
surviving spouse an elective share or forced share of the decedentspouse's property. 76 The elective share is just that-an election: the
surviving spouse has the right to take any property left to him or
her under the will or elect against the will and take the amount
specified by the elective share law instead.

72. Id. One could imagine that in unusual situations, dower could yield the
surviving spouse better financial results. The two most prevalent benefits of
dower over an elective share law are: (1) the inchoate rights inherent in dower
that may lessen the ability of the spouse to transfer real property inter vivos; and
(2) dower is given priority over creditors, which may protect the surviving
spouse if the estate is insolvent.
73. Id. at 425. For an overview of the variations, Dukeminier references
JEFFREY A. SCHOENBLUM, 2004 MULTISTATE GUIDE TO ESTATE PLANNING
Tables at 6-1-6-125 (2004). DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 425-26.
74. The history of the development of the myriad elective share laws in
America is beyond the scope of this Article. As one scholar noted, "It would
require a volume of some size, and more research than the subject is worth, to
recount all the developments of the rules permitting a surviving spouse to elect
against the will of the deceased spouse." LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND
THE DEAD HAND 16 (1955).
75. WILLIAM J. BOWE ET AL., PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 3.13 (2003).
76. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 425.
77. Id. Note that, as discussed below, in some states, the election is to take
the elective share or the property left to the surviving spouse by all sources,
whether via the will or outside the will (e.g., life insurance proceeds, qualified
retirement plans, joint property, etc.). See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-204
to 2-207 (amended 1993).
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A. TraditionalProbate-OnlyStatutes
Simply put, the conventional forced share is high4 arbitrary
and may in some instances work more harm than good
Starting in the 1930s, state-by-state transitions from dower to
elective share laws took place over several decades. 79 New York
state enacted the first elective share statute in this country.8 0
Legislators did so, it appears, based solely on anecdotal evidence
of two instances of disinheritance; no disinheritance studies had
been conducted at that time.
Some states retain what was originally the norm in this
country-an elective share statute giving the surviving spouse a
share (usually one-third to one-half) of the property in the
decedent-spouse's probate estate only. 82 Planning around a
probate-only type of law became so easy, and non-probate
transfers 83 became so common, that most states now have
toughened their laws to include, to some extent or another, nonprobate assets. 84 However, probate-only elective share laws still
exist today. 85
The probate-estate-only elective share laws have the advantage
of simplicity. As one commentator noted:
The probate court need only know the total value of the
estate to which the forced share applies and the applicable
proportion of the estate (as set out in the statute) to which
the surviving spouse is entitled. There is usually no
occasion for the taking of testimony about family
relationships and history, and no need for the application of
judicial discretion.8 6
Simplicity, however, has its disadvantages: "its total
insensitivity to the surviving spouse's actual need, the contribution
78. Brashier, supra note 35, at 102.
79. Id.at99n.51.
80. Id. Brashier also points to In re Estate of Rie/berg, for a chronology of
how the New York state legislature went about enacting the first elective share
law. Id. (citing In re Estate of Riefberg, 446 N.E.2d 424, 427 (N.Y. 1983)).
81. See Plager, supra note 29, at 685-86 (explaining that no empirical data
supported the findings "as to the frequency, and thus the social significance, of
disinheritance . . . .").
82. DUKEMINIER ET AL.,

supra note 2, at 438 (emphasis added).
83. For example, life insurance, joint tenancies, qualified retirement plans,
joint accounts and the like.
84. See generally discussion infra Part III.B.
85. See, e.g., Brashier,supra note 35, at 102.
86. Plager, supra note 29, at 682.
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the survivor may have made to the estate, and the reason
testator, who presumably knew his family situation as
anyone, preferred his particular dispository plan."47 The
only type of elective share laws have been subject
criticism.88

[Vol. 72
why the
well as
probateto stiff

B. Modern Trend: Augmented Share
The forced share system, as it currently exists in most states, is
difficult to justify. Recent societal changes have undermined
whatever usefulness the system might have had."
As previously noted, New York was the first state to make a
statutory attempt to deal with the issue of non-probate transfers
subject to the elective share. 90 This larger pie is, in most state
statutes, called the "augmented share" or "augmented estate." The
augmented share provides the asset pool from which the surviving
spouse's percentage is taken.
Other states soon followed New York's lead. Today, most
separate property jurisdictions have some version of an augmented
share concept. Because of the extreme variation among states, a
survey of exactly what types of property are included in the
augmented share is beyond the scope of this Article. However,
suffice it to say, most of these augmented estate laws still have
loopholes that good (read "expensive") planners can take advantage
of if a client has a need to plan around the elective share.
C. Uniform ProbateCode Provisions
If the goal is a partnership theory of marriage . .. it must be

recognized that while the revised UPC is certainly better than the
pre-1990 UPC and a step in the right direction, it is not a very

large step.91

87. Id.
88. See, e.g., Brashier, supra note 35, at 102; see also Sullivan v. Burkin,
460 N.E.2d 572, 577 (Mass. 1984) (reaching beyond probate estate to include
assets held in inter vivos trust).
89. J. Thomas Oldham, Should the Surviving Spouse's Forced Share be
Retained?, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 223, 224-25 (1987).
90. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 446; see also N.Y. EST. POWERS &
TRUSTS LAW ch. 952 (Consol. 1966), amended by N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS
LAW

§ 5-1.1-A (McKinney 2005).

91. Charles H. Whitebread, The Unform Probate Code's Nod to the
PartnershipTheory of Marriage: The 1990 Elective Share Revisions, 11 PROB.
L.J. 125, 139 (1992).
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The Uniform Probate Code incorporates the most inclusive and
detailed augmented share concept, leaving few, but still important,
loopholes. The goal of the UPC drafters was to approximate as
best as possible the division of property at death in a community
property jurisdiction. 93 Important differences remain, however.
One key difference is that the UPC augmented share embraces all
the property owned by both spouses, including property acquired
by gift and inheritance, as well as pre-marriage property. In
contrast, community property does not include property owned by
the spouses before marriage or property acquired by gift or
inheritance. 95 Because the augmented share (from which the
surviving spouse's share is calculated) is artificially increased by
inheritance and gifts, this can increase quite dramatically (and
quite unfairly) the share of the surviving spouse if the decedent
spouse had a great deal of inherited wealth. If, in addition, the
surviving spouse is wealthy in her own right, then she may not
receive any share of the marital property because the charge for her
wealth will offset the elective share amount she would otherwise
receive.
For various reasons, the most recent version of the UPC
elective share provisions has been adopted in only eight states. 96
IV.

MOVING AWAY FROM THE ELECTIVE SHARE AND SEPARATE
PROPERTY

Forced-sharelaw is the law of the second best. It undertakes
upon death to correct the failure of a separate-propertystate to
create the appropriatelifetime rights for spouses in each other's
earnings.
Legislatures need to directly address the goals of their marital
property systems. The goals of elective share statutes in separate
property states are based on one or more of the following: the

92. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-202 to 2-207 (amended 1993).
93. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 449-50.
94. Id.
95. Id. Note, however, that a couple may agree to characterize premarital
property, gifts and inheritances as community property. Id. at 456.
96. Id. at 449. These states, as Dukeminier points out, are mainly in the
Great Plains. Id. at 450. See JEFFREY A. SCHOENBLUM, 2004 MULTISTATE
GUIDE TO ESTATE PLANNING Table 6.03 (2004).
97. John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Redesigning the Spouse's
ForcedShare, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 303, 306 (1987); see also Brashier,
supra note 35, at 151 n.225.
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support theory, 98 the marital partnership theory, 99 or the contract
theory. 00 The situation is currently a confused jumble:
As it is, both the policy justifications and the effect of these
rules are flawed, confused, or conflicted. To illustrate
simply, most statutes cannot even choose whether they are
based on a support theory (that is, the surviving spouse
should not be left destitute and therefore a ward of the
state) or an economic partnership theory (that is, everything
acquired by investment or industry by either spouse during
the marriage should belong to them equally, as in
community property). This easily is shown by the vast
divergence in the size of the share from state to state. For
example, the surviving spouse's share can range from a low
of 0% to a high of 50% under the new Uniform Probate
Code accrual share regime (indicating a marital partnership
approach, based on the length of the marriage) but with a
support allowance in all cases (the Uniform Probate Code §
2-202(b) Supplemental Elective Share Amount, based on
the spouse's other property and property received outside
of probate). In some states the share can be as high as
100% in certain cases. And those states that still reflect a
one-third share presumably are attributable to the
dower/curtesy origins of elective share statutes, which
arguably are not informed by either the support or the
marital partnership theories....
The conflicted underpinnings of these statutes is especially
well illustrated by the fact that, in virtually all states, the
election is denied if the spouse has died before an election
is made. Quaere how to justify a marital partnership theory
underlying these statutes if the surviving spouse's property
98. The support theory of marital property states that all property is
considered marital property except for "property acquired by means of gift or
inheritance." HARRY D. KRAUSE & DAVID D. MEYER, FAMILY LAW IN A
NUTSHELL § 22.2 (4th ed. 2003). The surviving spouse has an interest in the
property according to title, and the marital property is divided. Id.
99. Under the marital partnership theory, "all property owned by the parties,
even if acquired before the marriage and held separately ever since, may be
reallocated.. . ." Id.

100. The contract theory of marital property allows "one or both parties to
waive their spousal rights" altogether. ANDERSEN & BLOOM, supra note 1, §
6.01 [E]. Note that if one espouses the contract theory of marriage, i.e., marriage
as a contract between competent adults, "then neither the arbitrary elective share
nor community property is necessary because the spouses may protect
themselves before and during the marriage without state intrusion." Brashier,
supra note 35, at 88.
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right substitute is defeated merely by the accident of dying
before making the claim. This bespeaks a support theory,
but it should not inform an accrual entitlement that
increases with the length of the marriage. The conflict also
is illustrated almost everywhere by the fact that an election
made on behalf of an incapacitated surviving spouse must
be justified on the basis of need. Again, if the statutes
reflect a marital partnership surrogate for community
property, why should need or death of the spouse before
completion of the election process be critical at all? 10 '
Another example of this confused identity is that some
jurisdictions allow the elective share to be satisfied by life interests
in property held in trust or otherwise, while other jurisdictions do
not. T In the former, the support theory can be seen, whereas the
latter suggests the partnership theory. 0 3
Finally, in most states, a surviving spouse that has abandoned a
decedent spouse is still entitled to his or her elective share. 04
Again, does this really comport with the notions of partnership
theory? 05 All of this can get confusing for even the most respected

scholars.

106

101. Pennell, supra note 9, at § 905 (citing Oldham, supra note 89, at 223);
see also DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 425, 432; see generally American
College of Trust and Estate Counsel ("ACTEC"), Study 10: Surviving Spouse's
Rights to Share in DeceasedSpouse's Estate (1994); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2212(a) (amended 2003); In re Estate of Crane, 649 N.Y.S.2d 1006 (N.Y. Sur.
Ct., 1996).
102. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supranote 2, at 425.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 433.
105. Id. (suggesting that perhaps the elective share should only apply to the
property owned by the decedent-spouse at the time the surviving spouse
abandoned the decedent-spouse, an arrangement that can be compared to the
California community property laws that deem earnings acquired after
separation not to be community property).
106. For example, in one edition of his classic book, Jesse Dukeminier
seemingly states the elective share purpose to be based on the support theory.
JESSE DUKEMINIER, JR. & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, FAMILY WEALTH
TRANSACTIONS: WILLS, TRUSTS, FUTURE INTERESTS, AND ESTATE PLANNING

461-63 (1st ed. 1972) (noting that the "forced share was [a] result of concern for
wife's possible disinheritance and the limited protection afforded by dower").
However, in a later version, he states the elective share purpose to be based on
the marital partnership theory. JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON,
WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES, 377-78 (4th ed. 1990) (policy underlying
elective share is the same as that underlying community property-to recognize
the spouse's contribution to the economic success of the marriage). See also
Brashier, supra note 35, at 151 n.255.
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The Uniform Probate Code's elective share provisions vo the
farthest in attempting to implement the partnership theory.'o With
a sliding percentage ranging from 0-50%, the UPC awards the
surviving spouse a higher percentage of the decedent-spouse's
assets the longer the marriage lasts on the theory that the longer the
marriage, the greater the amount of property acquired through
marriage partnership efforts.' 0 8
But even this seems like the poor man's community property
system. As the epigram under the heading of this section indicates,
the 1990 UPC drafters concur: "Forced-share law is the law of the
second best. It undertakes upon death to correct the failure of a
separate-property state to create the appropriate lifetime rights for
spouses in each other's earnings."' 09
A. Like in Community PropertyJurisdictions,Distributionat Death
Should Be More Consistent With Distributionupon Divorce
In the past few decades, a consensus has developed regarding
the method of property distribution at divorce. Both separate and
community property jurisdictions are moving in the direction of
equitable distribution, i.e., family law courts can divide property
accumulated by either spouse if acquired through that spouse's
efforts.' 10 This type of division best reflects the marital partnership
view of marriage-that the spouses should share the fruits of the
marital effort, no more and no less. II
Neither the partnership nor the support theory of marriage
would allow a surviving spouse to have any interest, either at
divorce or at death, in property received by the decedent-spouse
through inheritance and gifts or from property owned before
marriage.11 2 Clearly, these assets are not derived from a marital
partnership and support should come, if at all, from assets earned
during the marriage. Today, many separate property jurisdictions,
as well as the Uniform Probate Code, give the surviving spouse a
share of total assets (including inheritance and premarital assets);
therefore, there is decidedly less consensus between community
and separate property states regarding division of property at
death.'1 This is an important issue given the very large sums
107. See generally UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II, pt. 2, general cmt. (amended
1993).
108.

DUKEMINIER ET AL., supranote 2, at 427.

109. Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 97, at 306.
110. Oldham, supra note 89, at 223.
111. Id. at 223-24.
112. Id. at 223.
113. Id. at 224.
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expected to be passed from one generation to the next via
inheritance over the next few decades. 4
This is just one of many examples where the two schemes of
distribution in separate property states are fundamentally different.
But should they be? The laws governing the distribution of
property at divorce and at death in community property
jurisdictions are quite similar, which is the way it ought to be.
B. There Is FundamentalInequity with CurrentElective Share
Schemes: Those Who Can Afford SophisticatedLegal Advisors
Can Usually Plan Around the Laws
Only the poor and the stupid need conform [to the elective
share laws].'
Separate property systems are too flawed to save.
If the statutes creating such valuable rights for widows ...
are subject to easy evasion by transfers inter vivos, their
utility is slight indeed. . . . In view of the jurisprudence in
some states, the question may well be put whether these
statutes have been placed on our books for any sincere
enforcement. Or do they simply represent a sort of
sentimental desire of the community which must be
formally registered but need not inconvenience those with
means to consult competent counsel? Are these laws a mere
pious wish, a sort of sanctimonious recital of what we
should prefer but will not insist upon?116
As seen below, in any elective share jurisdiction, if one pays a
high enough price to a good estate planning attorney, and is willing
to accept at least some amount of hassle, then the elective share
laws can be circumvented, and a spouse disinherited. For those
individuals, however, who are unable to engage in this type of
planning for financial reasons, it is most certainly not a level

114. See Alan Newman, Incorporatingthe PartnershipTheory of Marriage
Into Elective-Share Law: The Approximation System of the Uniform Probate
Code and the Deferred-Community-PropertyAlternative, 49 EMORY L.J. 487,
517 (2000) ("According to a relatively recent study, the generation commonly
referred to as the 'Baby Boomers' can expect to inherit some $ 10.4 trillion over
the fifty-year period from 1990 to 2040, with the average size of each of the
projected 115 million bequests being slightly more than $ 90,000 (both amounts
stated in 1989 dollars).").
115. Cahn, supra note 17, at 150.
116. Id.
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playing field.' 1 7 These individuals have no choice but to accept the
spousal forced heirship regimes."
Since there is no way to tighten the laws enough to keep high
net worth individuals from exploiting the system, separate property
jurisdictions should move to community property because of this
fundamental unfairness embedded in separate property systems. As
one commentator noted:
A more reasonable surmise about the porous nature of these
statutes is that legislatures are not totally committed to the
concept of an elective share: to the extent they retain escape
hatches the legislature may be indicating that those who
want to engage in this planning badly enough to hire
competent counsel ought to have the opportunity. Thus,
freedom of testation remains available to those decedents
with enough wealth to be well-advised. This last response
may suggest that these laws ought to be repealed and, if
appropriate in the first instance, replaced with rules that are
effective to protect the policies underlying these statutes. As
it is, any approach that is circumventable-and every
elective share statute is more easily avoided than community
property-merely creates unjustified expectations and
reliance by the nonpropertied spouse." 9
117. See, e.g., Tanya K. Hernandez, The Property of Death, 60 U. PITT. L.
REV. 971, 988 (1999) (arguing that "only the wealthy have expansive
testamentary freedom because their resources are extensive enough to fulfill
societal expectations of support to biological family members and
simultaneously include bequests to others" (citing MARVIN B. SUSSMAN ET AL.,
THE FAMILY AND INHERITANCE 6 (1970))); see also Lawrence M. Friedman, The
Law of the Living, the Law of the Dead: Property,Succession, and Society, 1966
Wis. L. REV. 340, 377:
Freedom of testation, then, is most truly a working reality for the upper
classes, but even for them it is hedged about with restrictions. The
lower down the economic scale one goes, the higher the likelihood that
assets will largely be bound assets outside the system of testation or
subject to levy by the nuclear family.
118. Testators in separate property states with large estates have the
testamentary freedom to choose how and to whom the estate shall be distributed.
SUSSMAN ET AL., supra note 117, at 5. Note, however, that the testator of a small
estate, i.e., an estate under the statutory mandatory allowance amount, has
essentially no testamentary freedom-his or her will is basically of no use vis-6vis its dispositive provisions. See id. ("Limited assets induce forced succession
even though the testator might have had other things in mind.") The assets in a
small estate will most likely "be consumed entirely in payment of debts or by
the exemption, year's allowance, and other provisions. . . ." Id

119. Pennell, supra note 9, § 905. Pennell goes on to say:
So, for example, if it is correct to say that "[t]he presumed intent of
husbands and wives [is] to pool their fortunes . . . an unspoken or
imputed marital bargain . . . that each is to enjoy a half interest in the
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1. PlanningAround Separate PropertyElective Share Laws
[T]he beauty of theforced share. . . is only skin deep; protection
is announced,but it is not given.120
a. Simple ProbateAvoidance Techniques that Retain Grantor
Control
A substantial minority of states still allow a grantor to establish
a simple revocable inter vivos trust that will not be subject to the
elective share at death.121 Revocable trusts are very common, and
are as easy to prepare as a will. Once executed, a grantor must only
retitle his or her property into the name of the revocable trust, and
that property so retitled is no longer subject to probate at the
grantor's death. There are many legitimate reasons for wanting to
avoid probate (such as eliminating potentially costly and lengthy
court proceedings at death, privacy, and immediate access to assets
by beneficiaries at death, among others) such that this cannot be
labeled a "disinheritance technique."
As trustee of the revocable trust, a grantor can retain virtually
the same control that he or she would have if the property were
held outright. This leads to a form-over-substance argument that,
in theory, elective share laws should treat assets held in revocable
trusts the same as assets held outright by a decedent.
Anyone who wants to disinherit their spouse can do so very
easily in one of the jurisdictions that follows the traditional elective
share-type laws. This leads to a dichotomy between those who
engage in some modest amount of estate planning and those who

economic production of the marriage .

.

. nominally acquired by and

titled in the sole name of either partner," then the ability to circumvent
these statutes indicates that reliance on this implied understanding is
unjustified, a chimera if one spouse chooses to breach the bargain. Also
quaere whether the presumption is correct: if the spouses remain
married but one spouse "reneges" on the "bargain," isn't this proof
positive that the presumption itself is flawed and that these statutes
should not be premised on it? Either way you look at the issue, it seems
fair to argue that these laws either are inappropriate from their
inception because they are based on flawed assumptions, or they defeat
expectations because they are so easy to avoid.
Id. (citing Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition, 59
Mo. L. REv. 21, 43 (1994)).
120. Ariela R. Dubler, In the Shadow of Marriage: Single Women and the
Legal Construction of the Family and the State, 112 YALE L.J. 1641, 1708
(2003) (citing W.D. MACDONALD, FREAUD ON THE WIDOW'S SHARE 3 (1960)).
121. See Pennell, supra note 9, § 904.1; BOWE ETAL., supra note 75, § 3.20.
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simply have wills prepared. In these jurisdictions, legislatures
should switch to community property because it is so easy to avoid
being subject to the elective share laws.
b. Other Elective Share Avoidance Techniques
There are a wide variety of elective share laws, from the
substantial minority of jurisdictions that allow assets -placed in
revocable trusts to avoid claims by a surviving spouse,' to those
jurisdictions that have incorporated the Uniform Probate Code's
very tough elective share provisions.123
Although difficult to summarize, there are several techniques
that someone who engages in some level of planning could utilize
to avoid being subject to elective share laws. One technique is
outright gifts. The simplest measure, one which works in any
jurisdiction, is to simply give away property to someone other than
your spouse with no strings attached. In most jurisdictions, this
works immediately (even on your death bed), and in Uniform
Probate Code states, this works as long as the grantor lives two
years after the gift.124 A second technique includes most nonprobate transfers. Many states allow some or all non-probate
transfers to be outside the elective share system. This would
include life insurance,125 qualified retirement plans, joint tenancies,
joint accounts, most irrevocable trusts, etc. 12 A third technique is
pre- or postnuptial agreements. If the spouses agree to opt out of
the elective share system in a separate property state, they can do
so by contractual agreement. 12 A fourth option is to change
domicile. One could move away from a strict jurisdiction to one
that has more loopholes; or to Georgia, which has eliminated the
elective share altogether. The situs of the property itself could also
be moved to a more favorable jurisdiction. There are, of course,
choice-of-law considerations in play with these tactics, and careful
122. See discussionsupra Part IV.B. l.a.
123. See Pennell, supra note 9, § 904.3; see also DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra
note 2, at 445 (Connecticut and Ohio are two states in which non-probate
transfers are not subject to the elective share).
124. See Pennell, supra note 9, § 904.3B n.80; UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2205(3)(C) (West, Westlaw through 2010 Annual Meeting of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law).
125. Neither the states nor the federal government interfere with one's right
to designate whomever he wishes to receive life insurance proceeds. Why have
we chosen this path with insurance but not, for example, with ERISA retirement
plans? In theory, one could easily invest quite a large portion of his assets into
life insurance policies designated to go to one or more non-spousal beneficiaries.
126. See Pennell, supra note 9, § 904.3F n.91 (citing ACTEC, supra note 101).
127. Pennell, supra note 9, § 904.3A.
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planning should occur before any such move. 128 Fifth, many states
have favorable laws that allow individuals with incompetent
spouses to structure, at a minimum, any marital devices such that
the decedent retains control over the ultimate disposition of that
property after the death of the incompetent spouse. 129 Older
versions of the Uniform Probate Code, in fact, allow an elective
share only if "necessary to provide adequate support" for the
actuarial life expectancy of the incompetent surviving spouse.130
Sixth, spouses may purchase treasury obligations. New York law
exempts U.S. savings bonds and Treasury bills from its elective
share regime based on perceived Constitutional conflicts.' 3 1 Even
if one is not a New York resident, it may be possible to take
advantage of this aspect of New York law by locating these assets
in New York.132 Lastly, for short-term marriages, spouses may
utilize the Uniform Probate Code. As discussed above, the
Uniform Probate Code provisions set up a sliding scale, starting at
zero percent for shorter-term marriages. 133 Thus, establishing
domicile in a Uniform Probate Code state would effectively
disinherit a spouse in a short-term marriage.
c. PlanningAround the Uniform ProbateCode Elective Share
Provision
The relatively new elective share provisions of the Uniform
Probate Code are the toughest in the country to avoid. There are,
however, a few ways to plan around even these laws. First, one
could set up an irrevocable life insurance trust and have the trustee
purchase a life insurance policy; or, one could even transfer an
existing policy to a new trust with a two-year waiting period.13 4
Second, gifts given more than two years before death also escape
the Uniform Probate Code provisions.' 35 Third, one could provide
all the consideration for a joint purchase of property with a nonspouse, with the result that only 50% of the value will be subject to
128. Id. §§ 904.3C-3D.
129. Id. § 904.3N.
130. Id. (citing UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-203 (amended 2006)); see also
DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 425-28.
131. Pennell, supra note 9, § 904.3E (citing N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS
LAW § 5-1.1(b)(2)(C) (McKinney 1997)).
132. See id
133. See id. § 904.3M (citing UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (amended
2006)).
134. See id § 904.3G (citing UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-205(2)(i) (amended
2006)).
135. Id. (citing UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-205(3) (amended 2006)).
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Finally, annual exclusion gifts (currently
) are exempted.13 8

2. Establishingan Offshore Trust
Foreignjurisdictions don't recognize a spouse's right to an
elective share against the estate. Therefore, assets that are
transferred to an offshore jurisdiction will not be subject to the
claims of a surviving spouse. 39
Commentators do not seem to be discussing what may be the
surest way around the elective share laws while still allowing the
grantor to remain a discretionary beneficiary: offshore asset
protection trusts. 140 If prepared and implemented properly, these
trusts-set up in the modem era in the Cook Islands and similar
jurisdictions-allow a great deal of flexibility while keeping the
trust assets beyond the reach of American courts. Therefore, no
matter what the state elective share legislation reads, if the money
is offshore, it is not coming back.
This type of planning is becoming more commonplace and
much easier to implement than a couple of decades ago. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that, recently, people are generally much more
worried about asset protection and are more often setting up
offshore trusts for asset protection reasons, not necessarily to get
around the elective share laws. No matter the motivation, however,
make no mistake that these trusts are very much dodging the
elective share laws. Offshore asset protection planning tops the
debate between "haves and have-nots," with this "nuclear option"
unavailable to ordinary citizens who cannot afford the relatively
large fees associated with this type of planning.
V. MOVING TOWARD COMMUNITY PROPERTY
Resolved, [t]hat the laws of property, as affecting married
parties, demand a thorough revisal, so that all rights may be
equal between them; that the wife may have, during hfe, an
136. Id. (citing UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-205(l)(ii)).
137. Rev. Proc. 2010-40, 2010-46 I.R.B. 663.
138. Pennell, supra note 9, § 904.3G (citing UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2205(3)).
139. Brinker & Langdon, supra note 15, at 32.
140. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 557-60 (discussing self-settled
asset protection trusts). Note that I am not discussing fraudulent conveyances,
but rather legal offshore transfers. "Fraud is so old a villain that courts should
find little difficulty in recognizing his face." Cahn, supra note 17, at 153.
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equal control over the property gained by their mutual toil
andsacrifices, be heir to her husbandprecisely to the extent
that he is heir to her, and entitled, at her death, to dispose by
will of the same share of thejointproperty as he is.14
This resolution could have been passed yesterday. Sadly,
though, it was proclaimed in 1850.142 As a society, we have not
made much headway in implementing community property laws,
but in my view we absolutely should. Limiting a decedent's
control over his property is a right with no force if there is no
parallel limit on property transfers during lifetime.
"How can a restraint on testamentary power be made effective
without a corresponding restraint on the inter vivos power of
disposition?"143 If a separate property jurisdiction is really
interested in implementing a system that tracks most closely the
marital partnership theory of marriage, then there is no question
that it should simply switch to a community property theory of
marriage and property disposition.'"
141. Reva B. Siegel, Home As Work: The First Woman's Rights Claims
Concerning Wives' Household Labor, 18501880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1113
(1994) (quoting PROCEEDINGS OF THE WOMAN'S RIGHTS CONVENTION, HELD AT
WORCESTER, OCTOBER 23D & 24TH, 1850 (Boston, Prentiss & Sawyer 1851)).
142. Id.
143. SIMES, supra note 74, at 25; see also GLENDON, supra note 10, at 245
(arguing that the principal weakness of the American forced share "is that it can
be defeated by lifetime transfers that deplete the estate").
144. See Brashier, supra note 35, at 88. Note that only nine states currently
have a system of community property: Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25211 West, Westlaw current through the First Regular Session and Third Special
Session of the Fiftieth Legislature (2011)), California (CAL. FAM. CODE § 760
(West 2004)), Idaho (IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-906 (West, Westlaw current
through (2011) Chs. 1-335 that are effective on or before July 1, 2011)),
Louisiana (LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2338 (2009)), Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT.

ANN. § 123.220 (West, Westlaw current through the 2009 75th Regular Session
and the 2010 26th Special Session of the Nevada Legislature and technical
corrections received from the Legislative Counsel Bureau (2010))), New Mexico
(N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-2 (West, Westlaw current through the First Regular
Session of the 50th Legislature (2011))), Texas (TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.002
(West 2006)), Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.030 (West,
Westlaw current through August 1, 2011)), and Wisconsin (Wis. STAT. ANN. §
766.001 (West, Westlaw current through 2011 Act 31, published 07/11/2011)).
Alaska allows spouses to choose whether to be subject to community or separate
property (ALASKA STAT. § 34.77.030 (West, Westlaw current through the 2010
Second Regular Session of the 26th Legislature)). DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra
note 2, at 455. These states, however, represent over one-fourth of the U.S.
population. Id. As summarized by Dukeminier:
Community property in the United States is a community of acquests:
Husband and wife own the earnings and acquisitions from earnings of
both spouses during marriage in undivided equal shares. Whatever is
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The community property theory of asset distribution' 45 is much
more effective at protecting the non-wage-earning spouse,
especially during life, as he or she has an immediate property
interest in any property deemed earnings during the marriage.
There are significant limitations on the rights of one spouse to
transfer community property without spousal consent. 146 if
implemented properly, this would close most of the loopholes
inherent in even the best separate property elective share law.14 7
Prohibiting a person from disposing of his or her property in the
manner of his or her choice at death will lead only to a bizarre race
against the clock to give away property as death approaches, and
who knows when that will be? This approach requires individuals
to be both psychic and quick in order to fulfill their wishes. Most
likely, they will not be both, thus frustrating a primary tenet of
both property law (the right to do with your property what you
choose) and decedents' estates law (that the testator's intent is

bought with earnings is community property. All property that is not
community property is the separate property of one spouse or the other
or, in the case of a tenancy in common or joint tenancy, of both.
Separate property includes property acquired before marriage and
property acquired during marriage by gift or inheritance. In Idaho,
Louisiana, and Texas, income from separate property is community
property. In the other community property states, income from separate
property retains its separate character.. . . .
Almost all community property states follow the theory that husband
and wife own equal shares in each item of community property at
death.
Id. at 455, 457.
145. To be clear, there are two types of community property utilized in the
world: the Spanish system in use in America today and the universal community
system, of Germanic origin, used in Roman-Dutch law. In the Germanic system,
"all property owned by either spouse at the time of the marriage becomes
community property when the marriage is entered into," and any property,
regardless of source, obtained during marriage becomes community property.
Brashier, supra note 35, at 95 n.38. The current UPC elective share provisions
purport to employ this universal community approach at the death of a spouse,
despite the fact that no American jurisdiction utilizes the universal community
property system during life. Id. As John Lennon might say, "Strange days
indeed; strange days indeed." JOHN LENNON, NOBODY TOLD ME (Polydor
Records 1984).
146. See Oldham, supra note 89, at 229; Kathy T. Graham, The Uniform
Marital Property Act: A Solutionfor Common Law Property Systems?, 48 S.D.
L. REV. 455, 464 (2003) (For example, § 6 of the Uniform Marital Property Act,
which seeks to implement community property concepts on a uniform basis,
"restricts the ability of a spouse to gift marital property valued in excess of five
hundred dollars.").
147. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 456-57.
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paramount). As one scholar notes, "If we prevented them from
bestowing it in the open and explicit mode of bequest, we could
not prevent them from transferring it before the close of their lives,
and we should open a door to vexatious and perpetual

litigation."l148
Commentators have agreed with this view, noting, for example,
that "eventually all states will have to abandon elective or forced
share law and adopt some sort of community property system" if
the partnership theory of marriage is to be implemented
nationwide,14 9 and that:
To the extent that the elective share is now being
recharacterized as a posthumous means of correcting
deficiencies in the common law system of ownership of
marital property, legislatures should instead focus their
attention on correcting that system during the marriage, not
at its end. If states wish to view marriage as an economic
partnership in which contributions of each spouse should be
recognized, then they must adopt community property
principles, not forced share statutes that provide recognition
of spousal contributions only to the survivor when the
marriage is terminated by death.s 0
In addition, feminist scholars have heaped quite harsh criticism
on the continued separate property regimes in most jurisdictions.'
The greatest injustice associated with separate property
systems (even with the newest elective share statute) is the
situation where the non-earning spouse dies first.152 In that case, he
148. Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the
Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 11 (1992) (quoting WILLIAM GODWIN, ENQUIRY
CONCERNING POLITICAL JUSTICE 718-19 (Penguin Classics 1985) (1793)); see
also 1 FRANCIS HUTCHESON, A SYSTEM OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 352 (Augustus
M. Kelley Publishers 1968) (1755) ("Take away this right and ... men must be
forced into a pretty hazardous conduct by actually giving away during life
whatever they acquire beyond their own probable consumption.").
149. Brashier, supra note 35, at 152 n.226 (quoting Whitebread, supra note
91, at 142).
150. Id. at 152 (citations omitted).
151. See, e.g., Mary Louise Fellows, Wills and Trusts: The Kingdom of the
Fathers, 10 LAW & INEQ. 137, 150-51 (1991) (arguing that modem estate
planning, from the female viewpoint, has not progressed much past the
fourteenth century). Fellows notes: "How else can we explain the continuing
reliance in the majority of states on inheritance and forced share rights, rather
than the community-property system, to acknowledge the contribution and
support needs of spouses?" Id.
152. Id. at 151 ("Recognizing a wife's claim to the marital estate only if she
survives is wholly consistent with the maintenance (or vessel) ideology of the

186

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

or she would have no ability to devise any property that the eamin
spouse accumulated during the marriage to his or her children.
With multiple marriages (perhaps each with children) becoming
more commonplace, society can no longer assume that both
spouses have identical testamentary intentions.154 Thus, the UPC's
promise of implementing the marital partnership theory becomes
increasingly irrelevant.
VI. CONCLUSION
If, as a policymaker, one believes the marital partnership
theory of marriage to be gospel, then, by goodness, change to
community property and be done with it. Do not, as many states
have done, choose separate property (an inherently nonpartnership, eat-what-you-kill philosophy) and then try to graft
some back-end sorry excuse for community property at death. As
LBJ 15 would say, "That dog won't hunt."
The fact the privileged can pay their way out of any elective
share law and the less financially fortunate cannot, is a real
injustice which must be rectified. Elective share laws have been
around since the 1930s in this country; and, even with seventy-plus
years of tinkering, these laws are still too easy for a good enough
attorney to bypass.
Elective share laws seem like some school child's Rube
Goldberg machinel 57 trying, in as complex a manner as humanly
possible, to solve a problem which community property already
solves. Every few years, law professors huddle to build a better
elective share mousetrap, but it still does not work.
Let us stop this costly arms race and simplify by implementing
community property: it is the only logical outcome.

fourteenth century. It denies the wife the right to testamentary control over
capital except, and only reluctantly, when practicality demands this solution.").
153. See Oldham, supra note 89, at 229.
154. Id. at 235.
155. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 427; see also Whitebread, supra
note 91, at 140-44 (discussing the benefits of converting to community
property, and noting that the conversion to the Uniform Marital Property Act
would be easier than most believe and that it has gone well in the one state that
has adopted it (i.e., Wisconsin)).
156. Lyndon B. Johnson, Master of the Senate, Texan extraordinaire, and
U.S. President.
157. A Rube Goldberg machine "takes a simple task and makes it
extraordinarily complicated." Biography, RUBE GOLDBERG.COM, http://www.
rubegoldberg.com/?page=bio (last visited August 21, 2011).

